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Abstract 
 
This chapter takes a medium-term view of developments in China’s Xinjiang Uyghur 
Autonomous Region over a period of twenty years during which the indigenous Turkic 
Muslim Uyghurs were transformed in popular discourse from ethnic separatists to religious 
extremists. It considers the factors that impelled a shift in the voicing of dissent from the 
“new folk” songs of the 1990s to radical anashid in the 2010s. It focuses on the roles played 
by different forms of technology in the circulation and reception of these sounds, and the 
ways in which this affects the relationship between the sounds of dissent, the territories they 
contest, and the communities they hail.  
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Dissonant voices in the harmonious society 
 In the tightly policed public sphere of China’s Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region 
there is no sanctioned space for protest, while dissent is broadly construed as any form of 
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expression which might be read as contrary to official efforts to construct the “harmonious 
society” of China’s “big family” of nationalities. The “harmonious society” was an all-
pervasive slogan introduced in the early 2000s by China’s then leader, Hu Jintao. It was 
widely used in Xinjiang as part of campaigns to target social unrest and interethnic tensions, 
and to present idealized displays of social cohesion, typically involving mass performances of 
patriotic songs and colorful folkloric dancing. In this context, where musical performance is 
so thoroughly co-opted by the state and where protest is so severely delimited, protest music 
must be broadly defined, and it seems particularly appropriate to focus more broadly on the 
“dissonant voices” (cf. Paranhos 2011), which express sentiments not congruent with state 
narratives. This chapter focuses on the remarkable shift in register in these dissonant voices 
that has occurred over the twenty-year period between 1995 and 2015, a shift which mirrored 
the changes in music technology during this period.1 
 In the 1990s, Uyghur singers began to release cassette recordings of obliquely 
allegorical nationalist poetry sung to the accompaniment of the dutar two-stringed, long-
necked lute. This “new folk,” a distinctively local musical style, filled the bazaars and the 
long-distance buses, and defined a distinctively Uyghur regional soundscape. These musical 
productions attempted to articulate Uyghur national identity2 and nationalist concerns while 
evading the label of “attempting to split the [Chinese] motherland.” The style endured into 
the next decade, and survived the transition to VCD technology, but increasingly tight 
controls on lyric content saw the end of this genre as a site of dissent, and it gradually 
receded in popularity over the next decade. Instead, new forms of technology—primarily 
social media platforms accessed on mobile phones—carried a new wave of dissonant voices. 
In the aftermath of an outbreak of interethnic violence in Ürümchi,3 the capital of the 
Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, in 2009, radically new ways of voicing dissent 
emerged on Uyghur media networks. These anonymous, privately circulating voices adopted 
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and localized expressive forms associated with globalized radical Islam: recorded sermons 
and sung anashid that praised violent struggle and martyrdom. These voices promoted new 
forms of identity and new narratives of dissent. They were no longer regarded by the state as 
“separatist”; instead they were heard as “religious extremism” and “terrorism.” This chapter 
considers the factors underlying this shift: the role of different technologies in the production 
of communities of dissent, the affective experience of listening to the mediated voice, and the 
place of dissenting voices in the soundscape. 
 
Cassettes and bazaars 
 The independent music industry in Xinjiang arose in the early 1980s with the easing 
of government controls on cultural and economic life across China. Cassette recorders 
became available for the first time in the shops, and local independent producers were able to 
produce and market their own cassette tapes. Uyghur pop and traditional productions released 
by Chinese recording companies could be found on sale alongside bootlegs of western pop, 
rock and light music, and Hindi film songs (Harris 2002). Early production was a backroom 
affair. Basic equipment was used to record live performances, and producers made copies, 
five at a time, in their homes or under the counters at their shops. By the mid-1990s, more 
sophisticated recording technology had arrived in Ürümchi studios, and independent music 
producers could send their productions to China’s state-owned production companies—who 
were then experimenting with the open market—for production. During this period, the 
industry was regulated with a relatively light touch: song lyrics required approval from the 
censor’s office, but this approval was not hard to obtain. VCD technology was beginning to 
make inroads but cheap, easily reproduced and often poor quality cassettes were still the 
norm.  
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 As Peter Manuel (1993) argues in his study of the independent cassette industry in 
India, cassette technology may serve as a local counterforce to national and transnational 
control of the recording industry. In Xinjiang, the independent cassette industry was a 
significant factor in forging new models of Uyghur national identity in the aftermath of three 
decades of revolutionary upheaval.4 This new Uyghur identity was based on early to mid-
twentieth century nationalist movements; it was largely constituted in opposition to Chinese 
rule, and it overlaid local, intra-ethnic cultural divisions. 
 The urban soundscape of Ürümchi in the 1990s clearly stated the ethnic divide. Taped 
music delimited ethnic territory. The Uyghur heartland in the south of the city (Döng Kövrük 
in Uyghur, Erdaoqiao in Chinese) at that time consisted of a ramshackle collection of 
restaurants and shops centered on the main mosque. Its crowded, brightly colored bustle and 
air of poverty was permanently awash with Uyghur pop and folk music, each shop 
contributing another stereo system to the din. A cassette player was an essential ingredient for 
clothing shops and small restaurants. Many of the food stalls which set up outside the Döng 
Kövrük cinema at night, selling noodles, kebabs, stuffed sheep’s lungs, or boiled sheep’s 
heads, had their own source of music. Music dominated the complex of stalls making up the 
heart of Döng Kövrük, which sold many goods imported from neighboring countries: dress 
materials from Uzbekistan and household ornaments and henna dye from Pakistan, alongside 
goods from around Xinjiang: hand-crafted knives from Kashgar, and hand-woven carpets and 
silk from Khotän. The bazaars, at that time, were the place to hear popular music in Xinjiang. 
They functioned as a kind of unofficial charts; the density of advertising posters, as well as 
the number of shops and restaurants playing a particular cassette, provided a reliable guide to 
the latest hit. In contrast, the sounds of Mandapop5 filled the Han Chinese-dominated 
shopping areas to the north of the city. Here a new high-rise department store selling high-
end Chinese and Western brands seemed to open every week, while the latest wave of 
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impoverished rural Chinese migrants crowded its shiny steps peddling cheap plastic goods 
produced in the factories of southern China. 
 In the burgeoning sphere of soundscape studies, several authors have considered the 
role of sound in shaping public space and defining community in contested urban 
environments. Matt Sakakeeny’s close reading of a New Orleans brass band in a funeral 
parade passing under a concrete bridge notes how urban structures and participatory sound 
work together to orient the individuals involved in the parade as a collective (Sakakeeny 
2010:2). Brass bands help to shape the New Orleans soundscape for the African American 
community, and through their music-making they reclaim and resignify the built environment 
which historically worked to exclude and disempower them. Conversely, Noriko Manabe 
focuses on the ways in which the built environment helps to shape protest music, highlighting 
Japanese anti-nuclear activists’ deft use of Tokyo’s dense urban geography to maximize the 
impact of their sound demonstrations. Demonstration organizers tailor their sound to suit the 
path of the march or exploit the urban topography to amplify their sound messages and 
maximise the community building capacity of the demonstration (Manabe 2015: 234-254).  
 This capacity of sounded practices to reshape the urban environment is also 
emphasised in studies of the Islamic revival. In Cairo in the mid-1990s, the practice of 
playing recordings of Qur’anic recitation in cafes or sermon tapes in shared taxis helped to 
reshape the moral architecture of the city, introducing norms of sociability associated with 
the mosque into public spaces (Hirschkind 2006: 6). Writing on the Islamic soundscape of 
Mombasa, Andrew Eisenberg (2013) emphasizes the role of the adhan (call to prayer) in 
recruiting a set of bodily practices in listeners that produce and reinforce pious sensibilities. 
Through their embodied responses to the sound of the adhan, Muslims transform the 
ostensibly public spaces of their neighborhoods into the private spaces of the Muslim 
community. In Ürümchi in the 1990s, we can see similar spatial practices at work, as 
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Uyghurs reclaimed the public urban space of the bazaar as an ethnically marked place 
belonging to the Uyghur community. These were places where the norms of Uyghur sociality 
prevailed, sonically marked by recorded music and the Uyghur language, sensorily marked 
by the smells of local foods—grilled meat and baking bread—and they created a refuge from 
the wider Chinese sphere and the encroachment of the new Chinese migrants.  
 The dominant musical style of the Xinjiang bazaars cassettes was the “new folk,” a 
post-revolutionary Uyghur folk music revival that seemed to blare out, thick with reverb, 
from every stall and every restaurant in the mid-1990s. It was a distinctive new sound—a 
national style which drew on and overlaid the local oasis styles. Modally it was darker than 
the traditional repertoires, with a marked preference for the melodic minor scale. The style 
was exemplified by three male professional singers: Küräsh Kösän, Abdurehim Heyit, and 
Ömärjan Alim. Their booming bass vocal style synthesized the trained, operatic technique of 
the professional troupes with the declamatory style of the Uyghur bards, the dastanchi 
(singers of dastan epic poems) who could still sometimes be found in regional bazaars and 
shrine festivals. This vocal style was well suited to assume a dominant place in the public 
soundscape. They accompanied themselves, often in virtuosic fashion, on the dutar plucked 
lute. This, the most common Uyghur instrument, which was kept hanging on the wall in 
many households, had hitherto featured very little in public professional performance. Now it 
appeared in the public sphere as a marker of national identity and authenticity. With their 
poetic language, rich in the styles of metaphor and allegory familiar from folk song and 
dastan, the songs also enjoyed unprecedented sales in rural areas, and they spread out from 
Ürümchi in tentacular fashion via the sound systems of the long-distance buses which linked 
Ürümchi to the outlying regions of Xinjiang. Unlike the more regulated soundspace of the 
trains that brought Chinese migrants from central China to Ürümchi, and which typically 
featured upbeat Chinese-language songs extolling the gentler beauties of Xinjiang and its 
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welcoming young women, the long-distance buses were filled with Uyghur passengers, and 
their Uyghur drivers were free to choose their own music. In my own experience of riding the 
region’s long-distance buses in the 1990s, these portentous songs became indelibly associated 
with the spectacular desert landscapes of the Taklimakan. This association was underlined by 
the music videos, which inevitably featured (often poorly photo-shopped) images of the 
singer juxtaposed with a jagged outcrop of rock or vista of rolling sand dunes. 
 
The New Uyghur Folk 
 The role of this new folk song movement in expressing modes of Uyghur protest, and 
claiming space for these modes of protest on the city streets, crystalized around the funeral of 
the Uyghur novelist and poet, Abdurehim Ötkur in 1995. Ötkur spent most of the 
revolutionary decades of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) rule in prison, and was released 
only in the late 1970s. He went on to publish three influential novels, which represented an 
attempt to reconstruct the history of the Uyghur people. An iconic poem, “Iz” (Tracks), was 
published in 1985 as a preface to the first of these novels. Set in eastern Xinjiang during the 
bloody peasant revolt of 1912, the novel—and particularly the poem which prefaced it—
served as a nationalist call to arms for Uyghurs, a call to remember their history and preserve 
their identity. The “tracks” or “footprints” of the title served as a metaphor for the Uyghur 
nation’s history, all too easily erased in the region’s shifting desert sands. Gardner Bovingdon 
comments eloquently on the reception of this poem in the mid-1990s: 
 
Because the journey seemed to have been completed by the novel’s end, the censors 
allowed it to be published. But Uyghurs clipped out the poem and printed it by itself on 
posters, made it the frontispiece of magazines, or even scrawled it on building walls. 
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Stripped from the historical setting of the novel, the poem referred to a still unfinished 
journey towards Uyghur independence. (Bovingdon 2004: 365) 
 
 Ötkur died in 1995 a national hero. His funeral was a huge and emotional affair. His 
supporters paraded the coffin through the streets of Ürümchi, and crowds lined the roads with 
public demonstrations of grief. Uyghur singers released several cassettes mourning him, and 
setting his poetry to song. The most popular of these was undoubtedly Ömärjan Alim’s Qaldi 
Iz. Alongside the titular poem by Ötkur, it included many other politically resonant songs 
written by contemporary Uyghur poets. These songs took the standard state narrative of 
China’s “big family of friendly nationalities,” and recast the relationship between Han 
Chinese and Uyghurs as that of colonizer to colonized (Smith 2007). They also offered a 
stringent critique of contemporary Uyghur society and culture. The lyrics sung by Ömärjan 
Alim lamented the Uyghur national character as they sang it into being—it was a character 
marked by passivity, opportunism, decadence, and disunity. 
 “I Brought Home a Guest” (Mehman Bashlidim), released on Qaldi Iz, reflects 
anxieties about the burgeoning numbers of Han Chinese migrants arriving in the region in the 
1990s, linking the tradition of hospitality—a founding principle of the Uyghur national 
character—to gullibility: 
 
I invited a guest into my home 
Asked him to sit on a soft cushion 
And now I can’t get in 
To the home I built myself 
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Another song, “Barren Chickens” (Tüghmäs Tokhu), reflects on the inadequacies of (Chinese 
appointed) Uyghur officials and elites, commenting on their failure to help or protect the 
Uyghur people while other more competent and committed individuals were excluded from 
government: 
 
Barren chickens sit  
Occupy the roost 
While those who could lay eggs 
Roam the streets 
 
 In 1995 I spoke with Mehmet,6 a sound engineer in an impressively equipped and 
privately owned recording studio in Ürümchi, about the significance of Ömärjan’s music: 
 
We recorded his last cassette, Tracks (Qaldi Iz). People were so used to the poor quality 
of his previous recordings that when they first heard this they said, “This can’t be 
Ömärjan.” What a joke! This cassette has sold around 100,000 copies . . . Why such a 
hit? . . . Ömärjan has caught the heart of the Uyghur peasants, that’s 90 percent of the 
population. He is popular because his words are direct, easily understood. He uses 
peasant language, proverbs. There’s a double meaning in every word . . . it’s not 
necessarily political, but it’s usually read that way. 
 
 In 1995, the Xinjiang government introduced a “strike-hard” anti-separatism 
campaign in response to the growing Uyghur nationalist sentiment. It was the first of a series 
of government campaigns targeting the expression of dissent in the Xinjiang region, which 
later morphed into the “anti-religious extremism” campaigns that continue to the present day. 
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Tighter controls on the Uyghur recording industry were introduced, requiring producers to 
obtain approval for song lyrics from the Cultural Bureau, and limiting Uyghur music 
production to just two approved recording companies. Many producers were forced out of 
business, but others found ways to adapt, as Mehmet explained: 
 
We thought that Tracks would never pass the censor, but it did ... The music producers 
have a selling strategy: when a cassette is about to come out, they flood the shops with 
posters and say, “We think they are going to ban this one.” Everyone gets interested. 
Then they bring out a lot of copies, and say, “Buy quickly before the censor has second 
thoughts.” If a thing is banned, people assume it must be interesting. 
 
 This flourishing of allegorical expressions of Uyghur national identity in the sphere of 
the “new folk” music came to an end in 1997 with the violent suppression of demonstrations 
by Uyghurs in the northern town of Ghulja, protesting a ban by the local authorities on a 
community movement to combat alcohol and drug abuse. From this point, the state was no 
longer prepared to tolerate public expressions of dissent or Uyghur national identity—which 
were now largely conflated with dissent or the crime of “separatism” (actions intended to 
“split the Motherland” by promoting the separation of Xinjiang from the Chinese polity). The 
violent suppression of the demonstrations was followed by a new crackdown on Uyghur 
cultural expression. Over the next decade, critique gave way to lament, and the trope of 
mourning began to feature strongly in Uyghur popular culture. By the late 1990s, coinciding 
with the onset of VCD technology, it seemed almost obligatory for Uyghur pop albums to 
conclude with a song mourning a relative, with the singer pictured wandering forlornly in a 
graveyard. These songs seemed to be expressions of a new sense of self within Uyghur 
popular culture, one that equated national identity with grief and loss. 
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 At the same time, the dominance of the “new folk” in the Ürümchi soundscape 
withered away as an urban renewal project swept away the old ramshackle bazaar, food and 
music stalls, and replaced them with a monumental new commercial and tourist development, 
which was opened in 2003. It was modeled on the medieval Islamic architecture of Central 
Asia, but it housed a Carrefour Supermarket, a Kentucky Fried Chicken outlet, tourist-
orientated stalls selling Uyghur crafts, and a dedicated space for song-and-dance troupe 
performances. The independent music shops clung on in the underpasses beneath the new 
ring road for a few years, but eventually fell victim to a new shift in technology, away from 
VCDs and towards digitally mediated listening. 
 
The new virtual soundscape  
Duing the 2000s, aided by innovations that facilitated the use of the Uyghur Arabic 
script online, the Uyghur Internet grew into a large, vibrant space filled with news, blogs, 
music, bulletin boards and chatrooms. The increasing surveillance of public space and the 
policing of social gatherings served to push young people, especially urbanites and students, 
towards online life as an alternative space for social activity. Cheap Internet cafés (wangba) 
provided the major point of access to the Internet. Xinjiang-based Uyghur language websites 
such as Makanim.com and Diyarim.com offered sections on Uyghur culture and history, 
contemporary literature and poetry, interviews and online chat with prominent Uyghur 
writers and musicians. They devoted considerable space to Uyghur music videos.  
Web blogs and forums were the prime site of a new wave of dissent in the lead up to 
the 5 July 2009 incident in Ürümchi, when a demonstration protesting the killings of Uyghur 
factory workers in southern China was broken up by police, sparking a night of rioting and 
interethnic violence (Millward 2009). State media characterized the incident as an explosion 
of separatist sentiment and Islamist terror, spread through the medium of the Internet by 
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hostile foreign forces. This official characterization permitted mass arrests of Uyghur youth, 
and the cleansing of Uyghur rural-urban migrants from the city. In fact, the new online 
discourse leading up to the incident showed much continuity with the nationalist discourse of 
the 1990s, as can be seen in this call, posted on a Uyghur language web forum, to join the 5 
July demonstration: 
 
Invitation to a mourning ceremony (näzir) 
On 26 June 2009 between midnight until 7am in Xuri toy factory in Shaoguan, 
Guangdong, more than 10,000 Han Chinese gathered because of rumors that Uyghurs 
had attacked a Han girl. They forced their way into a dormitory and attacked and killed 
innocent Uyghur factory workers. During the incident more than 50 of our Uyghur 
brothers were killed, while another 300 escaped into the streets. . .  
You people who spend your time drinking alcohol, gambling, or taking drugs, 
you mothers who don’t care about your children’s education but spend your time 
attending parties in restaurants, you young people who enjoy falling in love and 
breaking hearts, we invite you all to attend this quiet mourning ceremony for our 
martyred brothers who have lost their lives. Please stop your entertainment for a while. 
Our children’s blood should not be spilled in vain. We ask all of you to contribute your 
strength for the future of our nation. (translated in Harris & Isa 2011: 40) 
 
Here again is the sense of national moral decline and the ever-present trope of mourning, 
alongside the new figure of the martyr, a figure that began to be a constant presence in a new 
discourse of dissent. The Uyghur websites were closed down and their editors imprisoned in 
the aftermath of the 2009 violence. Over the following few years, Uyghur dissent took on a 
more strongly religious tone, and it shifted into the new context of social media. 
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 Religious media began to filter into the Xinjiang region in the 1980s, in the form of 
cassettes brought back from the hajj (pilgrimage to Mecca) or traded across the border from 
Pakistan and neighbouring Central Asian states. Developments in technology in this sphere 
mirrored the popular music market, and cassettes were gradually replaced by VCDs. Under 
the “strike hard” campaigns, the sale of recordings of Qur’anic recitation and other religious 
media was prohibited, but the ban was uneven and the black market continued to flourish. As 
access to the Internet became more widespread in Xinjiang during the first decade of the 
twentieth century, new ways of accessing global Islamic media became possible, although 
heavily filtered by state control systems. Beginning in 2011, a huge rise in the use of smart 
phones and various forms of social media across urban and rural areas of Xinjiang enabled 
the formation of new social networks centred on sharing and discussing religious media. 
 In January 2011, the Chinese IT giant Tencent launched the smartphone app WeChat 
(in Chinese: Weixin, in Uyghur: Ündidar). By 2013 it had become the media of choice for 
some 600 million users worldwide, 500 million of them within China. Amongst Uyghur 
users, too, Ündidar became an essential communication tool. Between 2013 and 2014, 
several million Uyghurs inside Xinjiang and in the diaspora were using this app, often several 
times a day, to chat with their friends and to participate in online groups or circles, sharing 
short audio messages, text, images, links, audio and video files. During this period there was 
a steady rise in the circulation of religious images, audio-video files, audio messages and 
discussion. The speed of the spread of this new discourse, and the increasing radicalization of 
some of the content, was remarkable. All this communication proceeded for over a year with 
apparently little control or surveillance, until the state apparently caught up with the new 
technology and implemented a crackdown in summer 2014, banning all forms of religious 
expression on social media, and implementing the ban through systematic checking of 
people’s phones. 
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 The WeChat platform provides particular affordances for the creation of new forms of 
association, specific to its capabilities as a media platform (cf Tufekci 2017: 110-112). It 
offers a choice between one-to-one messaging, closed circles, and posting to all friends. 
People can share text messages, images including their own photos, links, and emoticons. 
They can record and share their own audio messages and videos. They can also maintain a 
semi-public profile, posting regular personal status updates in order to craft an online 
persona. Thus it is a flexible platform—it ranges between the intimate (especially in its 
capability for voice messaging) and public—and arguably a democratic platform, in that it 
supports local production, encourages grassroots voices and creativity—much in the same 
way that Peter Manuel (1993) noted in the case of the Indian cassette industry. These 
similarities made the medium suitable for voicing dissent in a tightly-policed environment, 
but there were significant differences between the voicing of Uyghur dissent via the medium 
of cassettes and via social media, and especially significant differences in the ways that this 
discourse was produced, disseminated, and consumed. 
 As many authors have noted, small media—whose circulation is not centrally 
controlled or directed—stretch the boundaries of the audience and introduce new senses of 
community, so that locality is increasingly defined by circulation (Schulz 2006). The WeChat 
platform permitted the formation of “friend circles,” semi-private groups that might be 
constituted by Uyghurs living within Xinjiang alongside friends, family, or new virtual 
acquaintances living in Los Angeles, Paris, Istanbul or Shanghai. Within these groups people 
could share links and files originating from a wide range of sources, and they could comment 
on them, either by text or in voice messages. As media theorists have noted, such digital 
networks provide affordances for new types of protest, which resemble collective action but 
without the role previously played by formal organizations. These new forms of protest have 
been termed  “connective action”: that is forms of action that are de-centred and distributed, 
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in the sense that they can exist without central organization and cross geographical borders, 
and dynamic, in terms of the changing populations who may opt in and out of play (Bennett 
& Segerberg 2012: 752-759).  
 
New forms of piety 
 Recent work in the anthropology of Islam considers a related set of questions, in 
particular the ways in which mediated sounds and images accessed by Muslims via social 
media impact upon the affective experience of faith (Hirschkind 2012), practices of self-
fashioning (Mahmood 2005), and the geographies of knowledge and experience. The 
religious material shared on Ündidar during this period was diverse, revealing a wide range 
of different religious sensibilities, and ongoing debates amongst Uyghurs concerning what 
constituted true Islam and how to be a good Muslim. Through a range of images, text, and 
audio files, the majority of postings on Ündidar promoted the values of daily prayer, piety 
and modesty as ideal lifestyles, in an often miracle-laden and affective style of discourse.  
 Accessing religious media in this way—listening to sermons and Qur’anic recitation, 
sharing exhortations to self-improvement—has become part of daily practice for Muslims 
across the world, part of an ethical and political project which promotes social responsibility, 
pious deportment and devotional practice. Hirschkind has argued that recorded vocal 
performances “create the sensory conditions of an emergent ethical and political lifeworld” 
(2006:8). These practices are not generally about direct forms of dissent or protest, rather 
they entail and enable the creation of new kinds of publics (Hirschkind 2006; Schulz 2012; 
Stokes 2013, 2016). For Uyghurs in this period, especially for the younger generation, the 
turn to new styles of religious piety suggested the failure of the secular nationalist project in 
the face of increasing state oppression, a reaching out to other struggling Muslim peoples 
around the globe and simultaneously a turning inwards, a sense that the personal discipline of 
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religious practice was now the only possible response to their experience of economic and 
political marginalization. 
 The religious media circulating on Ündidar during this period included some more 
overtly nationalist, political styles of Islam, which linked the failure of the Uyghur nation to 
follow true Islam to their oppression by a Communist regime. It also included a small number 
of anashid: songs which promoted the virtues of jihad and sought to create empathetic bonds 
between listeners and an imagined community of mujahidin (guerrilla fighters). These most 
radical examples of the new Islamic forms of dissent were generally shared by younger and 
less educated individuals (Harris & Isa forthcoming). 
 In form, musical style, and religious orientation, this new Islamic discourse was very 
different from the 1990s nationalist song productions, but there were continuities in the 
discourse of self. They signalled a sense of crisis—one personally and collectively 
experienced—to which Islam, in various forms, offered a solution through personal and 
collective transformation. A common theme was the question of national survival: only by 
becoming true Muslims could Uyghurs withstand oppressive and assimilative rule, and only 
by becoming true Muslims could Uyghurs counter damaging tendencies in society like drug 
abuse, alcoholism, fraud, and prostitution, since these immoral acts spring from living in a 
non-Muslim society. 
 One striking aspect of the arrival of these new dissenting voices in Uyghur society 
was their almost total absence from the public soundscape. Whereas the Islamic revival in 
Egypt was marked by the sounds of cassette sermons into shared taxis and the recited Qur’an 
into cafes, Uyghur consumption and sharing of religious media was a largely private and 
secretive affair. Anthropologist Cindy Huang describes the consumption of religious media 
by one of her informants in Ürümchi in the early 2000s. When she was at home, Peride 
performed her daily prayers and surrounded herself with religious media, but when she was at 
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work or with friends, she rarely mentioned religion. Huang suggests that this might be due to 
the restrictions on religious practice that made people wary of appearing overly religious in 
public, but it also reflected a division between two different sensory worlds: inside was where 
Peride cultivated her faith, outside was not (Huang 2009: 39). Such “subterranean” listening 
practices, and their particular entwinement of sound and subject, are increasingly common in 
the modern sensory landscape (Hirschkind 2006: 73), especially under conditions of tight 
state control. 
 In the post-2009 period in Xinjiang, as the anti-religious extremism campaign7 
tightened its hold, public expression of religious faith became too “sensitive” for the public 
sphere, but the sphere of social media gave people an illusory sense of privacy, a sense of 
speaking within a group of intimate and like-minded friends. In this “public-private” sphere, 
emerging forms of religiosity and new forms of affective connection flourished, and they 
converged with older forms of nationalist dissent, finding their most radical expression in the 
sung form of anashid religious chants. 
 
Violence and sacrifice 
 
Letter to my Mother (Anamgha yezilghan khät)8 
 
If someone says, you can live for a hundred years as a rabbit,  
I reply, I wish to live for one day as a tiger.  
Please, mother, understand that your son is now a mujahid,  
I must be brave in spirit.  
The rocks and stones will be my blanket.  
As long as I live I will continue to do jihad.  
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Pray to Allah for us.  
I will be happy to die on the battlefield as a mujahid.  
Maybe some day you will hear a quiet voice.  
If that voice says that your son has died,  
Mother, then your son is living joyfully in heaven.  
Never doubt that the martyrs  
Will find joy in heaven.9 
 
 This powerfully affective nashid10 circulated in audio and video versions across the 
Uyghur diaspora and within Xinjiang, on various media platforms including Facebook and 
YouTube, and we found it being shared on Ündidar in 2013. The recording featured a young 
male spoken voice, heavy with reverb, speaking directly to his mother, followed by a sung 
nashid performed by the same solo voice. It was unaccompanied by musical instruments, so 
in the view of orthodox Muslims “not music,” and religiously permissable. With its youthful 
pop voice, repeated falling riffs and use of vocal counterpoint, in melodic style it was clearly 
linked to the transnational sound world of Islamic anashid, and worlds away from the local 
dutar style of the Uyghur “new folk” of the 1990s. However, the concerns expressed in the 
accompanying video, which featured footage of the 2009 Ürümchi violence and the 
subsequent arrests and executions of young Uyghurs, were closely tied to tropes of Uyghur 
identity developed during the 1990s: the bitter perception of Chinese colonization and state 
violence against Uyghurs. The anashid offered a solution to this painful reality in the 
religious purity, brotherhood and sacrifice of the mujahidin. 
 Audio media like this impel us to pay attention to the affective power of the voice, 
and the particularities of the mediated voice. The aesthetic and affective quality of the solo 
male voice is an important aspect of radical anashid. Thomas Hegghammer relays the 
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testimony of the wife of a Yemeni jihadi who performed anashid in order to recruit new 
members: 
 
Abeer Al Hassani’s ex-husband was famed for his beautiful voice. He used it, she says, 
singing poetic hymns to martyrdom and jihad to try to draw youth from their 
neighbourhood of the Yemeni capital into joining Al Qaida. (Hegghammer 2017: 17) 
 
They also impel us to focus on the sound quality of particular media forms. Audio files 
shared on smartphone are particularly good at transmitting affective properties because they 
help focus attention on the voice. The intimacy of the often solitary listening experience 
means that they are also good at signifying authenticity, conveying the urgency and affective 
impact of a charged moment of experience, caught and frozen in time and shared.  
 Dorothea Schulz has argued that mediated speech and voice have a special potential 
for mobilizing people’s agentive and affective faculties in Islamic cultures. She notes that 
voice and speech are considered to “touch” listeners in a way that is physically experienced. 
For this reason they have the capacity to move individuals from an attitude of passivity to 
action (Schulz 2012). Such views on the capacities of speech are rooted in the wider Islamic 
culture of orality centered on recitation of the Qur’an (Nelson 2001), and the virtues of 
listening (Hirschkind 2006). The movement to forms of action for the majority of people 
entail no more than adopting the forms of self-discipline required by a pious lifestyle: daily 
prayer, fasting, and modesty. If such forms of action are now considered by many Uyghurs to 
be the appropriate answer to their experience of colonial rule, a sense that only through 
proper attention to their religious duties could they persuade God to change their fate, the 
appearance of radical anashid within the wider field of Islamic media circulating on social 
media mobilized these new religious sensibilities, and refocused them on violent resistance. 
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 Traditional anashid—sung poetry praising Allah—have a long history in the Muslim 
world. Today, established recording industries across the Middle East and South East Asia 
cater to a significant subculture of listeners who consume locally popular styles of anashid. 
These are often linked to modern, reformist styles of Islam, but are not overtly political or 
radical (Pieslak 2015; Rasmussen 2010). In Turkey, new styles of popular religious song 
called anashid played a significant role in creating the new aesthetic and ethical conditions 
that led to the rise of the Islamist movement (Stokes 2016). Examples like the Uyghur “Letter 
to Mother” belong to a subgenre of radical or “jihadi” anashid which can be traced back to 
the late 1970s and early 1980s, a period of violent struggle between Islamists and 
governments in Syria and Egypt. Here, radical anashid formed an important aspect of the 
Islamist cultural offensive, and were used to reach new youth audiences and to inspire them 
to join the armed struggle (Said 2012: 863-5). Such anashid have been used as soundtracks 
for videos produced by Hamas, Fateh, and Hizbolla in the context of the Palestinian struggle. 
They are also used by Da’esh to accompany videos that depict their victories in battle in Iraq 
or Syria, or the killing of Western hostages. In Afghanistan, similar audio recordings of sung 
religious poetry called tarana have been circulated by the Taliban since the 1990s (Baily 
2001), first by cassette and more recently via social media, and used to glorify the mujahidin 
fighters and promote the necessity for jihad.  
 In January 2017, we spoke with Ehsan Hajim, an exiled Uyghur religious scholar 
based in Turkey. According to him, Uyghurs have been listening to anashid since they were 
first deployed during Afghan war: a conflict which was joined by small numbers of Uyghurs 
in the early 1990s: 
 
There’s no doubt that anashid played an important role in stirring up the young people 
and encouraging them to fight in these wars. People listen to anashid, and they cry . . .  
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They [the creators of anashid] try to get people emotional, excited, to inspire them. 
Their aim is to target young people who aren’t clear in their minds, to get them to join 
their jihad. This is not true Islam, persuading young people to go and get themselves 
killed . . . They take advantage of the weakness of our people who love Islam but do 
not understand the Qur’an and hadith. If they had better understanding they would not 
be cheated (Ehsan Hajim, Istanbul, Jan 2017). 
 
 Ehsan Hajim saw the anashid as essentially an Arab import: “The Arabs created them 
and the Uyghurs copied them; it’s an act of translation.” My reading of the Uyghur anashid is 
that this act of translation involves creative processes that we might read as forms of 
glocalization. Certain aspects of radical anashid are shared across productions in different 
languages, while other aspects of these productions reference local expressive traditions, 
experience and sensibilities. Among the various regional styles of radical anashid, probably 
the most clearly rooted in local expressive traditions are the tarana produced by the Taliban. 
The poetry draws on and manipulate Afghan cultural identifiers and historical memories, and 
the musical style, rooted in Pashtun folk song, drives home these forms of cultural intimacy 
with affective force (Johnson and Waheed 2011: 26-7). The anashid developed in Iraq and 
Syria, on the other hand, are more recognizably rooted in the globalized musical language of 
pop. Jonathan Pieslak notes the common use of a cappella song style, vocal harmonizations 
and arrangements in al-Qa’ida anashid. Their carefully crafted sonic texture draws on 
techniques of reverb, delay, and digitally manipulated effects familiar to listeners from the 
world of pop music production, with the aim of increasing the affective listening experience 
and the impact of the message (Pieslak 2015: 25-29).  
  The Uyghur anashid “Letter to my Mother” is a professional production, most likely 
recorded outside Xinjiang, which shares many of these attributes, with its use of the 
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compositional styles of multi-part harmony and canon, and digital effects of vocal distortion, 
reverb and echo. The singer’s voice bears the hallmarks of a trained professional pop singer. 
Ehsan Hajim confirms this impression: 
 
Recently we heard that some Uyghur pop singers had come to Turkey. They regretted 
all the things they’ve done in their lives—living like unbelievers—and they repented 
their sins, and then they started to produce anashid. (Ehsan Hajim, Istanbul, Jan 2017) 
 
 Another video circulating Uyghur networks in 2014, “They Don’t Understand” 
(Chushenmeydu) has the feel of an amateur back-room production. A poor quality, simply 
recorded young male voice sings in an undertone, almost as if he fears being overheard. The 
stepwise melody, with its sparing use of melisma, recalls the style of contemporary Uyghur 
pop. The singing is typically pop in style—breathy and natural—and is clearly amateur, 
wavering in metre and pitch. The result is intimate, authentic, and affective. The lyrics are 
more authoritative than the musical performance, showing a strong grasp of Uyghur poetic 
structure and style.  
 
There is only one direction for the hijrah (migration of the Prophet / road to 
jihad) 
Those who haven’t set out don’t know its taste 
They don’t understand the rewards of jihad 
To those who have never learned the truth 
Night looks like day 
Those who have never prayed  
Can never join the frontline of jihad 
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 Unlike “Letter to Mother,” whose musical style references al-Qa’ida anashid while 
the video conveyed images of the local struggle, in this production the song style references 
the local while the accompanying montage of images—posing Da’esh fighters with their 
iconic black flags and machine guns—has nothing to do with Uyghur concerns. This 
production moves the call to jihad beyond the sphere of nationalist struggle, calling Uyghur 
listeners to the global Muslim struggle. In this production, the enemy is no longer China but 
rather the Western powers, and the images of resistance of those of Da’esh. 
 There are creditable reports of small numbers of Uyghurs fighting with Da’esh in 
Syria in 2014, and Da’esh has produced Uyghur language anashid both with a view to recruit 
new Uyghur fighters, and to welcome new recruits (Rosenblatt 2016). Ehsan Hajim reported 
that the Uyghur fighters in Syria were divided into two factions: the “small community” 
(kichik jema’et) whose aim was to liberate their homeland from the Chinese, and the “big 
community” (chong jema’et), who rejected nationalist concerns and fought instead as part of 
the global mujahidin. He told an anecdote about a veteran Uyghur separatist, now in jail in 
Turkey, which reveals the shift in attitudes to armed struggle among militant Uyghurs in 
recent years:  
 
He said to me, “I have no problem with the ‘big community,’ but there is one point we 
can’t agree on: is China our enemy or not? Is East Turkistan our homeland or not?” I 
was very surprised. He told me, “I feel very tired. I joined the jihad to expel the 
Chinese from my homeland when I was fifteen. I’ve been in and out of prison all my 
life. The Chinese never got bored with locking me up, and I never got bored of cursing 
them. Now I’m over fifty, and I have used up all my strength trying to expel the 
occupier, but these new jihadis, they won’t even allow me to try anymore.” 
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This shift from the “small community” to the “big community” speaks directly to theories of 
“connective action”, and the affordances digital networks provide for forms of action that 
cross geographical borders and engage changing populations (Bennett & Segerberg 2012). 
The role of sung anashid in making these links is significant, in terms of their ability to make 
affective connections across borders. 
 
Conclusions 
In her recent study of digitally media and protest movements, Tufekci argues that 
technology rarely generates absolutely novel human behavior; rather it alters the spatial and 
temporal architecture of society, changing the terrain on which such behaviour takes place 
(Tufekci 2017: 129-131). The circulation of religious media amongst Uyghurs in Xinjiang 
exemplifies the processes of decontextualization and abstraction typical of digitally mediated 
productions. The sounds of dissent are no longer tied to the soundscape experienced by a co-
present community. Listeners experience these new forms of cultural intimacy in particular 
ways. The act of listening to the sounds of dissent, as they have shifted from the bazaar and 
the long-distance buses onto social media, has been accommodated to the architecture of the 
virtual environment with its specific modes of connectivity and affective experience. Social 
media technologies create connections across the globe with ease and immediacy, but as they 
do, so they divide the voice from the present body. The listening experience is at once 
personal, intimate, secret, and also public, offering the illusory freedom of a space of 
communication within a “private public sphere” (Warner 2005). Those who engage in these 
practices do not necessarily think of themselves as speaking to strangers, but they are 
engaging with avatars, and inhabiting imagined worlds which are predicated on anonymity 
(Hirschkind et al 2017). Such an environment lends itself to the circulation of extreme forms 
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of mediated experience, with which people can engage and then detach themselves from with 
ease, creating multiple personas and compartmentalizing their lives.  
 Just as local forms of Islam have been supplanted by the new mediated forms of 
Islamic revival, so too have older styles of nationalist identity formation and protest been 
supplanted by forms of dissent which are rooted in globalized radical Islam and increasingly 
deterritorialized. The self-conscious revival of national tradition exemplified by the dutar has 
been replaced by multi-part vocal harmonies rooted in contemporary globalized pop and 
newly come to signify radical Islam. Where in 1995, cassette technology delivered the 
booming voices of individual iconic singers into the soundscape of the bazaar, chastising and 
then mourning the nation, in 2013 new communities forged by the younger generation around 
social media platforms furtively shared audio files of anonymous voices who promoted 
messages of violent resistance, martyrdom, and the global community of Islamic jihad, 
through the sounds of globalized pop.  
 These mediated sounds and images extend the boundaries of what can be imagined, 
and they help to forge interpersonal bonds and build transnational communities of dissent. 
Although Uyghur practices of listening to anashid via social media were largely 
subterranean, as Noriko Manabe notes, cyberspace is not hermetically isolated: activities in it 
spill over into physically co-present space (Manabe 2015: 110). This capacity of online 
protest to provoke direct action on the streets was evident in the lead-up to the 2009 protests 
and subsequent violence in Ürümchi. The severity of the 2014 crackdown on social media in 
Xinjiang evidences the Chinese government’s deep concern over the ability of social media 
networks to develop into social movements with the capacity to provoke seemingly leaderless 
action on the ground.11 
 The role of musical sound in this process (even if its musicality is theologically 
denied) is also significant. As Pieslak notes, it is typically anashid rather than sermons or 
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ideological discussions that form the focal point around which members of radical Islamic 
online forums communicate (Pieslak 2015: 76). While most listeners engage with such items 
in a passive way, attracted by the thrill of the illicit, the extreme imagery of the 
accompanying videos and the affective beauty of the melody, these sounds may signal a path 
for those already propelled towards violence (be it through psychological disorder, trauma, or 
police harassment), and they may provide emotional support along that path.  
Another nashid circulating on Uyghur networks in 2014 provided a glimpse of the 
grim reality faced by those who were propelled along the path of jihad. Titled “The Jihadi of 
Guma” (Guma Jihadchiliri), it memorialized the deaths of a group of seven Uyghur men who 
were shot by police amidst a “strike hard” campaign, and subsequently labelled as “terrorists” 
by the Chinese media, although scant details were released to support this claim.12 The audio 
combined a short excerpt of Saudi-style Qur’anic recitation, followed by an Arabic language 
nashid. The accompanying footage, which was apparently taken from a Xinjiang police 
video, showed a manhunt culminating in shots of a pile of bloodied corpses lying in a 
cornfield. One man remained alive, cowering amongst the corn as the armed police yelled at 
him to come out. He shivered as he contemplated the choice between flight and immediate 
death, or to surrender and undergo protracted interrogation, imprisonment and possible 
execution. Uyghur language text imposed over this footage called for the “vengeance of the 
Umma” (Ummätning qisasi), but this video revealed only the desperate and pitiful condition 
of those men, armed with carving knives and facing the might of the Chinese military, 
pressed into the role of jihadis, cornered and shot as terrorists. 
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1 This chapter is based on my own fieldwork in Xinjiang since 1994. Since 2006 I have been working 
in collaboration with my husband and research partner, Aziz Isa, and I am indebted to him for his 
contributions to this article. 
2 The designation of the Uyghurs as a (stateless) nation rather than a “minority nationality” (shaoshu 
minzu) is widely accepted in Western scholarship. This is most clearly articulated in David Brophy’s 
(2016) monograph, which explores how a twentieth century community of Central Asian Muslims 
responded to the historic changes in the region by reinventing themselves as the modern Uyghur 
nation.  
3 In this chapter I follow the transliteration system for Uyghur adopted in most academic publications, 
see Bellér-Hann et al 2007 for details. 
4 The early stages of Chinese Communist Party rule in the 1950s saw the implementation of Uyghur 
language teaching in schools, the establishment of a network of Uyghur cultural troupes, a wave of 
Uyghur literary and scholarly publications, in part impelled by China’s favorable nationalities policies 
and in part by Uyghur nationalist fervor, but this work was swiftly reversed as China lurched towards 
the Cultural Revolution, and already by 1958 Uyghur nationalist intellectuals were being labeled as 
counter revolutionaries, imprisoned and persecuted. More liberal policies resumed in the 1980s. 
5 Mainstream popular songs sung in the national language of Mandarin Chinese (hanyu). 
6 All names in this chapter have been changed. 
7 For details of this campaign, which was ostensibly aimed at extremism but in fact targeted a wide 
range of everyday religious practices amongst Uyghurs including public prayer, fasting and veiling, 
see the report by the Uyghur Human Rights Project: China’s Iron-Fisted Repression of Uyghur 
Religious Freedom (Washington DC: UHRP, 2013).  
8 The audio file can be accessed on the “Sounding Islam in China” project website: 
http://www.soundislamchina.org/av/Anamgha_yezilghan_xet.mp3  
                                                     
This is a draft of a chapter that has been accepted for publication by Oxford University Press in the forthcoming book ‘The 
Oxford Handbook of Protest Music’ edited by Noriko Manabe and Eric Drott due for publication in 2018.  
Accepted version downloaded from SOAS Research Online: http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/25384/  
 
                                                                                                                                                                     
9 Lahoud (2017) also notes the presence of affective anashid that dwell on the sacrifice of mothers in 
al-Qa’ida productions. 
10 singular form: nashid, plural: anashid. 
11 A recent study of online censorship in China reported that censors swiftly acted to remove posts 
that had any potential to encourage collective action, and they were especially likely to act if multiple 
posts tending toward action were concentrated within a single geographical area. If the people making 
the posts were near each other, there would be more likelihood that they could come together and do 
something (Tufekci 2017: 234). 
12 https://uyghuramerican.org/press-release/uyghurs-shot-death-guma-county-amid-intense-state-led-
repression.html (accessed 29 May 20187). 
